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Montenegros Unilateral Euroization
Arslan Razmi
June 17, 2018
Abstract
Unilateral euroization is underexplored even in comparison to unilateral dollarization (taken
to mean the adoption of the US dollar as legal tender). This paper attempts to partly ll this
gap in the literature by investigating the case of Montenegro, which is one of the two countries
that have unilaterally adopted the euro as the legal tender. Montenegros limited monetary
policy options make the nature of business cycles important. The evidence presented here
suggests that Montenegro has a low degree of synchronization, limited structural similarity,
and weak trade integration with the Eurozone. Moreover, there is limited evidence for en-
dogenous structural assimilation following euroization. The case for currency union is weak for
Montenegro and appears to be defensible only on grounds of policy credibility.
JEL classications: F15, F45, E32, E52
Key words: Montenegro, euroization, dollarization, currency union, optimal currency areas.
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1 Introduction and Background
In an insightful analysis of increasing o¢ cial dollarization in the 1990s and early 2000s, Edwards
(2001) found it remarkable that this rather drastic piece of advice - giving up the national currency
- is being dispensed on the bases of very limited empirical and historical evidence.The dearth of
empirical and historical evidence is, if anything, even more glaring in the case of countries that
unilaterally euroized in recent years. An obvious underlying reason is the infancy of the euro
itself. The fact that, unlike the United States, the Eurozone lacks a scal or banking union that
help stabilize output within the currency area, makes analysis trickier. Moreover, the unusual
circumstances accompanying the unilateral euroization by Montenegro and Kosovo, including a
civil war and the Great Recession, make it challenging to gauge the consequences of euroization.
This paper attempts to investigate Montenegros euroization within the limitations imposed by
these constraints.
After unilaterally adopting the Deutsche Mark for two years, Montenegro o¢ cially and uni-
laterally euroized in 2002, adopting the euro rst as a parallel legal tender, and then as the only
legal tender. The main motive appears to have been the need to establish monetary stability
following bouts of high/hyper ination in the preceding decades.1 To date there are no o¢ cial
ties or agreements between Montenegro and the European Central Bank approving the use of the
euro as an o¢ cial currency and while Montenegro was given candidate status for European Union
membership in 2010, the path to Eurozone membership is still unclear.2
This paper investigates the evolution of the Montenegrin economy since the adoption of the
euro and political independence. I explore both monetary and real sector developments in order
to analyze the potential consequences of unilateral dollarization for Montenegro, especially in the
years following the Eurozone crisis. In particular, I examine the degree of Montenegrin integration
with the rest of the Eurozone, and compare it with other economies in the region. The severity
and duration of the Eurozone crisis, especially in the PIIGS (Portugal, Spain, Ireland, Italy, and
Spain) has given a new lease of life to interest in common currency issues. This is a good time to
take stock in the Montenegrin context.
To give a preview of the main conclusions, I nd that while Montenegro is likely to have bene-
tted from importing policy credibility, the Montenegrin economy is only weakly synchronized with
the Eurozone, and by some measures, has become less so over time. Euroization has helped little in
this regard. The lack of exchange rate exibility and monetary autonomy may therefore be quite
costly.
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 briey discusses the broad
issues involved and the literature relevant to them. Section 3 then analyzes the degree of structural
symmetry that exists between Montenegro and the Eurozone in a regional context. Section 4
narrows the focus to issues of monetary independence, followed by Section 5 which looks at other
measures of Montenegrin integration with the Eurozone as these have evolved since independence.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
1See Fabris et al. (2004) and Winkler et al. (2004).
2As a practical matter, the European Union has outlined a 3-step procedure for the monetary integration of
candidate countries. The applicants are required to rst join the European Union (EU), then become a part of
the exchange rate mechanism (ERM 2), and, as a nal step that follows satisfaction of the Maastricht convergence
criteria, join the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), i.e., the Eurozone.
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2 The Big PictureIssues
The choice made by Montenegrin policy makers can be broken down into two steps: (1) the adoption
of a xed exchange rate regime vis-á-vis the Euro area, and (2) the unilateral adoption of the euro
as legal tender. While step 2 can be seen as the most extreme form of exchange rate xing, it
does raise subtly di¤erent issues in the absence of a common scal authority that oversees transfers,
and the lack of a banking union and a lender of last resort. In particular, due to its more binding
nature, joining a monetary union renders renders more salient the role of asymmetries in economic
conditions.
A substantial body of literature now addresses the pros and cons of dollarization.3 The ad-
vantages often cited include increased microeconomic e¢ ciency (the liquidity services and network
externalities provided by a single currency circulating over a wider area), reduced transaction costs,
the elimination of currency risk and speculative attacks, enhanced policy credibility when it comes
to ination, development of the banking system, lower risk premia on sovereign bonds, reduced real
interest rates, and increased trade linkages with other members of the monetary union. Disadvan-
tages include the obvious and dramatic loss of monetary autonomy, the absence of seignorage gains,
lack of access to the exchange rate as a stabilizing tool in response to economic shocks, reduced room
for the functioning of a domestic lender of last resort, and, as a ip side to the credibility argument,
the voluntary limiting of the ability to use the ination tax in exceptional circumstances.
The context in which a country enters a monetary union matters. Joining a currency union
is likely to pose problems in the presence of asymmetric shocks and nominal rigidities. This was
recognized early on by the pioneering work of Mundell (1961) and others, who pointed out that a
common currency is optimal if either: (1) countries are exposed to symmetric shocks, or (2) if shocks
are asymmetric, feasible adjustment mechanisms exist to ensure stabilization. The mechanisms
could take the form of factor mobility, wage and price exibility, and scal transfers (Mundell
(1961)), integration of trade in goods and services (McKinnon (1963)), or a highly diversied
economic structure that helps dilute and absorb the e¤ects of shocks (Kenen (1969)).
While the criteria that are typically seen to shape the decision to enter into a monetary union
are often a focal point of discussion, whether or not these criteria are endogenous is itself a matter of
controversy. For example, Frankel and Rose (1998), and earlier in a major report, European Com-
mission (1990) argue that monetary integration may foster trade. Rose and Stanley (2005) provide
a meta-analysis that concludes that currency union increases trade by 30-90 percent. Trade inte-
gration, the argument goes, will increase intra-industry trade, foster business cycle synchronization
and reduce exposure to asymmetric real shocks. Meeting the preconditions for the introduction of
a foreign currency, therefore, may be much less important as an ex-ante concern. A di¤erent point
of view, associated with Krugman (1993), is captured by the so-called Krugman specialization hy-
pothesis,which raises the possibility that closer trade integration will undermine synchronization
among the countries in the monetary union. This view, which is based on trade theory, hypothesizes
that reduced transaction costs through integration will lead countries to become more specialized
in sectors in which they have a comparative advantage. An implication is that integration will
increase the likelihood of union members experiencing sector-specic asymmetric shocks.
3See, for example, Borensztein and Berg (2000), Winkler et al. (2004), Minda (2005) and Schuler (2005).
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3 Is Policy Independence an Issue for Montenegro?
The loss of monetary autonomy that results from adopting a foreign currency as legal tender
gains importance to the extent that a country is structurally di¤erent from the currency area, and
therefore requires unique policy responses to shocks. How important is this issue in the Montenegrin
context? Lets start by taking a look at some basic measures of Montenegros integration with the
Eurozone.4 Table 1 provides the raw (unconditioned) correlations of ination (Inflation), GDP
growth (GDP ), GDP per capita growth (GDPPC), gross national income growth (GNI), GNI
per capita growth (GNIPC), and the ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP (FDI=GDP ).
The period covered begins from Montenegrin independence to the latest year for which data are
available. The correlations are generally quite high for Montenegro, ranging between 0.78-0.87,
with the exception of the FDI to GDP ratio.
For comparison purposes, Table 1 also presents correlations for other countries, including former
Yugoslav republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, FYR, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia).5
The correlations generally tend to be high across the board. Not surprisingly, given that it is
already a member of the Eurozone, Slovenia exhibits the highest correlation as far as GDP and
GDP per capita are concerned, although this is not true for ination. Also, Serbian GDP and
GDP per capita exhibit the lowest correlation although still positive and substantial with the
corresponding Eurozone aggregates. This again is not surprising since, as we will see shortly, the
Serbian dinar uctuated the most against the euro during this period. In other words, Serbia is
an f exception among these countries in not pegging tightly to the euro. It is also interesting to
note that unlike GDP and GDP per capita, the correlation of GNI and GNI per capita is much
lower for Bulgaria, Macedonia (FYR), and Bosnia and Herzegovina compared to Serbia. This may
have to do with factor incomes, in particular wage and prot income remittances.6 Finally, the
correlation of the foreign direct investment to GDP ratio, substantially negative for most countries
(with the unsurprising exception of Slovenia), is almost zero for Montenegro. There is no sign of
FDI diversion from the Euro area to Montenegro.
One should note that the high correlations seen across the board between individual countries
and the Eurozone in Table 1 likely reect the global nature of the downturn in economic conditions
starting with the nancial crisis in 2008. I therefore turn next to a more formal exercise to analyze
the synchronization of Montenegrin shocks with the Euro area. A widely approach to evaluating
the business cycle synchronization between a country and a currency union consists of analyzing
the correlation between supply and demand shocks.7 This, in turn, builds on the structural vector
autoregression (SVAR) framework for identifying shocks developed by Blanchard and Quah (1989),
and is based on the well-known aggregate supply and aggregate demand (AS-AD) model. Since
the technical details are easily available,8 here I focus on the conceptual points and the analysis.
The Blanchard and Quah decomposition starts with an innite order moving average (MA)
representation of a bivariate SVAR. The e¤ects of demand and supply disturbances are measured
for two macroeconomic variables: (1) real output, and, (2) prices. Fluctuations in these variables,
in other words, are assumed to be due to supply and demand shocks. Since both variables are
generally non-stationary, I(1), processes, these are dened in rst di¤erenced form. Supply shocks
4Throughout the paper, the terms Eurozone and Euro area are used interchangeably.
5The status of Kosovo remains undecided.
6 It is interesting that, of all the countries in the sample, Serbia has had the largest proportional (and positive)
di¤erence between GDP and GNI over this period.
7See, for example, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) and Brixiová et al. (2010).
8See, for example, Jurgutyte (2006).
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Table 1: Correlations between individual country annual aggregates and the Eurozone over the
period 2006 - 2016. Source: Authors calculations based on WDI
Inflation GDP GDPPC GNI GNIPC FDI/GDP
Bosnia and Herz. 0.88 0.75 0.73 0.44 0.40 -0.47
Bulgaria 0.79 0.87 0.83 0.45 0.41 -0.61
Croatia 0.84 0.87 0.88 0.84 0.85 -0.58
Macedonia, FYR 0.38 0.76 0.72 0.33 0.29 -0.59
Montenegro 0.78 0.87 0.85 0.79 0.79 -0.02
Romania 0.88 0.74 0.67 0.62 0.54 -0.79
Serbia 0.76 0.64 0.61 0.55 0.53 -0.32
Slovenia 0.63 0.93 0.91 0.88 0.86 0.17
are assumed to have permanent e¤ects on output and the price level, while demand shocks have
permanent e¤ects only on the latter variable, i.e., the long-run aggregate supply curve is assumed
vertical.9 The e¤ect on output, therefore is decomposed into permanent and temporary e¤ects. In
addition, the framework imposes three other restrictions, two involving the variances of structural
shocks that are set equal to one, and a nal one that comes from the covariance of the reduced
VAR residuals (the unobserved structural residuals are assumed to be orthogonal).
Table 2 summarizes the results. Positive correlations indicate supply or demand shock syn-
chronization while the magnitudes capture the extent of such synchronization. The sample is
constrained by the fact that quarterly real GDP data for Montenegro is available only for the pe-
riod starting from the rst quarter of 2011. I use the consumer price index (CPI) to calculate
price ination. Based on the Akaike Information Criteria, I specify a maximum lag length of 4
quarters for Montenegro. For purposes of comparison, I also present similar results for several
other former Yugoslav republics including Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia (recall that the latter is
already a member of the Eurozone, and has been so since 2007). A lag length of four was uniformly
chosen in order to preserve the symmetry of the specication across countries.10
While there is no agreed threshold beyond which a country is considered su¢ ciently synchronized
with the currency union to become a member, Table 2 underlines the low correlation of shocks
between Montenegro and the Eurozone. With a supply correlation of 0.109 and a demand shock
correlation of 0.025, Montenegro displays much lower synchronization than Slovenia and Croatia.11
Not surprisingly, Serbia yields the lowest correlation for supply shocks among all the countries
while Slovenia, a Eurozone member throughout the period, yields the highest demand correlation.
It is interesting to note that supply side shocks are much more synchronized than demand side
9The identifying assumption that demand shocks do not have permanent e¤ects is a strong one, especially in the
context of our study that uses post Eurozone crisis data. Recent literature suggests that hysteresis can be a major
factor that hampers recoveries from deep recessions and liquidity traps. Given the scope of this paper, however, I
follow the standard practice in making this assumption.
10The LM tests for autocorrelation do not, with the partial exception of Slovenia, indicate serial correlation upto
lag order 8 at the 5 percent level of signicance.
11Considering the unique nature of the Montenegrin economy, especially the surge in activity due to summer
tourism, I re-estimated the SVAR after using a dummy variable for the third quarter of each year. The results do
not change noticeably.
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shocks. While the impulse response functions (not included here) display appreciable volatility,
it is reassuring that the exhibited patters are consistent with what one would expect from the
aggregate supply-aggregate demand framework: namely, that while positive demand shocks initially
raise both output and prices, supply shocks raise output and lower prices.12
How does Montenegros synchronization compare to that reported by previous studies for other
countries? The comparisons here, of course, have to be heavily qualied given that the period
that the present estimates cover has been far from a typical one, especially in the wake of the
Eurozone crisis and the continuing liquidity trap-like conditions. Given the Europe-wide nature
of the crisis, any estimates based on post-crisis data are likely to be biased toward nding greater
synchronization. With this caveat in mind, lets take a quick look at existing literature. Bayoumi
and Eichengreen (1992) provide an early study of European Commission (EC) countries and their
degree of business cycle synchronization (relative to Germany) compared to US regions (relative to
the mid East region). The degree of synchronization that I nd for Montenegro falls in the lower
end of the range for EC countries, which in turn were much less synchronized than US regions.13
Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2003) provide a set of estimates for synchronization between the Eurozone
on the one hand, and individual euro area economies and Central and East European (CEEC)
candidate countries on the other. They found that structural shocks were more asymmetric in
EU candidate countries than those in the euro area. The numbers reported for Montenegro in
Table 2 lie at the lower end of the spectrum compared to their estimates for euro area countries
but compare favorably with several CEEC countries. However, as noted above, our estimate for
Montenegro is likely to have been bloated by the Eurozone crisis.
In sum, the decomposition of Montenegros shocks does not provide much evidence for business
cycle synchronization with the Eurozone. This gives the issues of monetary policy autonomy and
policy credibility added importance.
As earlier discussed, some of the literature has argued that the extent of symmetry of shocks is
itself endogenous, and evolves with the degree of trade and monetary integration. Unfortunately,
I cannot test the endogeneity hypothesis in our context given the lack of data availability for a
longer time period for Montenegro. However, I will approach this question indirectly in Section 5
by analyzing the evolution of other relevant variables over the past decade.
Table 2: Blanchard-Quah decomposition, 2011:Q1-2017:Q3. Source: Authors calculations based
on IMFs International Financial Statistics database.
Supply Demand
Montenegro 0.109 0.025
Croatia 0.592 0.193
Slovenia 0.591 0.452
Serbia -0.260 0.342
12Serbia is the only exception. In this case, demand shocks appear to initially lower output while supply shocks
raise prices.
13 Interestingly, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) also generally found greater supply-side than demand-side sym-
metry.
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4 Monetary Autonomy and Policy Credibility
The previous section suggested asymmetry of shocks between Montenegro and the Eurozone. This
makes the availability of stabilization policy options important. Perhaps the most commonly cited
cost of joining a monetary union, or for that matter adopting a xed exchange rate, is the loss
of monetary autonomy. The idea, of course, goes back to the famous open economy impossible
trilemma. This section looks at the degree to which Montenegrin interest rate behavior and broader
macroeconomic direction has been inuenced by the decision to unilaterally euroize.
While Montenegro has adopted the euro as legal tender, it is by no means the only country in
the region that operates under an essentially xed exchange rate regime. Based on monthly data
for the period 2000-18, Table 3 uses the coe¢ cient of variation to show the volatility of various
regional currencies against the euro.14 Except for Serbia and Romania, which operate managed
oats, the other currencies have barely uctuated against the euro. This is not surprising since
some of these countries (Bosnia Herzegovina and Bulgaria) operate currency boards while others
plan to join the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) and then eventually the Eurozone, and use the
euro as a nominal anchor. We should, therefore, expect Serbia in particular to have more monetary
autonomy than the other countries in the region.
Table 3: Variation of nominal exchange rate over the period Jan. 2000 to February, 2018. Source:
Authors calculations based on Eurostat Mean Coefficient	of	VariationBulgarian	lev 1.954 0.002Croatian	kuna 7.462 0.018Romanian	leu 3.852 0.184Denar	(FYR	Macedonia) 61.335 0.004Serbian	dinar 96.126 0.214Bosnia	and	Herz.	convertible	mark 1.956 0.000
We will shortly turn to the issue of whether or not Montenegro has experienced lesser monetary
autonomy, as measured by comovement and cyclicity of interest rates, compared to other regional
countries. Before we do that, however, lets briey turn to the question of why a country would
compromise its monetary independence. Advocates of xed exchange rates present several argu-
ments, including the advantages of borrowed policy credibility in the form of lower ination and
lower interest rates. Moreover, the absence of exchange rate exibility and a lender of last resort,
and the inability to monetize decits are likely to discipline policy makers into more vigilance when
it comes to constraining scal behavior and current account decits. What does the picture look
like for Montenegro?
Figure 1 presents the ination di¤erentials from the Eurozone, based on the CPI over the
period 2000-16.15 The latter half of this period, of course, has been characterized by extremely
low ination across the advanced economies. While Montenegrin ination remained high relative
to the Eurozone, the di¤erential did generally fall over the period. However, this is also true
14The coe¢ cient for Montenegro obviously is zero. I use the coe¢ cient of variation here in order to better compare
di¤erent currencies which have very di¤erent mean values.
15CPI ination yields a similar picture but the available series is shorter for Montenegro.
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for Serbia and Romania (not shown), which operate a managed oat, and where the di¤erential
actually fell from a much higher level. Thus, while there was convergence it was not limited to the
xed exchange rate cases.
How does the picture extend to other measures of policy discipline such as scal policy and
the external account balance? According to IMF (2017), Montenegro ran a primary scal decit
of about 3.6 percent in 2015 and 2016, and an overall decit of about 6 percent. As Figure 2
illustrates, a much greater area of concern has been the continuous current account decit, which
has ranged from a high 13 percent to a whopping almost 50 percent during this period. The gure
underlines the fact that much of this decit has been nanced by foreign direct investment inows
(a large part of which went to the real estate, construction, banking, energy, and tourism sectors).
Unilateral adoption of the euro has not yet forced the hand of policy makers to take measures to
dramatically constrain external account imbalances.
Figure 1: Ination di¤erentials between countries and the Eurozone. Source: Authors calculations
based on WDI
One approach to evaluating the e¤ect of Eurozone monetary policy on Montenegrin lending
conditions would be to estimate the degree of interest rate pass through from the extremely short-
run rates that policy makers directly target into the interest rates on longer maturity transactions.
To do so, I use an autoregressive distributed lag approach with quarterly data. I specify the
ADL(p,q) model as follows:
rri;t = +1pri;t 1+2pri;t 2+3pri;t 3+1rri;t 1+2rri;t 2+3rri;t 3+"i;t (1)
where rr is the domestic interest rate for country i (on new loans to non-nancial corporations for
maturities of up to 1 year), pr is the Eurozone short-run rate (the Euro Overnight Index Average
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Figure 2: Evolution of current account and foreign direct investment. Source: WDI
or EONIA rate), t is a time index, " is the error term, which is assumed to be independent and
identically distributed, and  is the di¤erence operator (so that the associated terms are specied
in rst di¤erences). Note that I do not include the contemporary value of EONIA rate on the right
hand side because of the high frequency, monthly nature of the data.
Table 4 presents the results for Montenegro, the Eurozone, Croatia, and Serbia. Since the
sample covers the period including and following the Eurozone crisis, the estimates are likely to be
a¤ected by the atypically and consistently low interest rates that have prevailed in the Eurozone
for most of this period. Keeping in mind this important caveat, Eurozone short-run interest rate
changes appear to pass-through quite rapidly; the once-lagged response of longer-maturity interest
rates is positive, and with the exception of Serbia, statistically signicant.
The two right most columns present the calculated longer-run pass-through estimates.16 As
expected, the pass-through of short-run Eurozone interest rates into the Euro area interest rates
are positive and statistically signicant. The positive sign holds for Montenegro and Croatia as
well, although these are not signicant (which may be due to low variance, as noted above). The
positive sign is expected, of course, since one country has euroized while the other runs a tight
peg. Interestingly, the only country that does not yield positive pass-through is the one that
independently manages a oat.
Considering that interest rates di¤er signicantly, both in their mean levels and degrees of
variation, across these countries, I also provide standardized coe¢ cients in the last column. These
coe¢ cients are the point estimates of the coe¢ cients standardized by multiplying by the standard
16These long-run coe¢ cients are calculated using the expression:
P3
j=1 t j
1 P3j=1 t j .
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deviation of the dependent variable and dividing by the standard deviation of the regressor. As
expected, the highest standardized coe¢ cient is associated with the Euro area. The standardized
pass-through is positive although much smaller for Montenegro and Croatia.
In sum, and keeping in mind the caveats mentioned earlier, the analysis here is largely in line
with our theoretical expectations. The country that appears to exhibit the greatest degree of
monetary autonomy is Serbia with its managed oat.
Short-run interest rate policy is typically designed to respond to changes in economic conditions
in a countercyclical manner, although the weights assigned to di¤erent objectives di¤er across time
and countries. How does ECB interest rate policy behave in response to business cycle changes, and
more importantly from our perspective, how does this facilitate or hinder cyclical management in
euroized Montenegro? Here I attempt to provide some admitedly preliminary answers. I compare
Taylor-type policy reaction functions for the Eurozone, Montenegro, and Serbia. Specically, I
explore the response of the key ECB policy rate (pr) to lagged monthly changes in CPI ination
(p) and real GDP growth (y) using the following specication:
pri;t = + 1pri;t 1 + 2pi;t 1 + 3pi;t 2 + 1yi;t 1 + 2yi;t 2 + "i;t (2)
If policy is anticyclical, the  and  coe¢ cients will be positive. The ECB will respond to a
rise in real GDP growth or ination by raising short term rates.
Table 5 presents the results. The short-run coe¢ cients are always positive (although generally
not signicant), with the exception of twice-lagged ination for Serbia. The last four columns
provide the longer-run coe¢ cients. The only statistically signicant coe¢ cient is that for real GDP
growth in the Eurozone. Thus, while ECB policy has been anti-cyclical for both the Eurozone
and Montenegro, the e¤ect is statistically meaningful only for the Eurozone.17 Moreover, not
surprisingly, ECB policy has been much more sensitive to output changes in the Eurozone, as
seen from the larger coe¢ cient for ECB growth than for Montenegrin growth. While, this is not
unexpected given that ECB policy is targeted at conditions in the Eurozone, it does raise concerns
about the cost of unilateral euroization.
Given the lack of a counterfactual, pre-euroization Montenegro, I follow Sokic and Fabris (2013)
in trying to indirectly investigate the benets of retaining some monetary autonomy. In order to
do so, I utilize data on changes in the key National Bank of Serbia policy interest rate in response
to economic conditions. The lower quarter of Table 5 summarizes the results. The coe¢ cients for
Serbia are now much more statistically signicant, although still not so at conventional levels. With
this qualier in mind, notice that the Serbian policy rate now displays countercyclical behavior; the
long-run coe¢ cients for both ination and output are now positive unlike the case where I used the
ECB key policy rate. Consistent with Sokic and Fabris (2013) , the results indicate that Serbian
policy makers reacted much more strongly to ination changes than to output changes.
In sum, while the ECB interest rate policy has been directed towards Eurozone conditions, with a
weaker pass-through into Montenegrin interest rates, and negative pass-through into Serbian interest
rates, the National bank of Serbia directed policy toward Serbian conditions. Taken together, these
estimates suggest that euroization may have hindered the ability of Montenegrin policy makers to
react in a stabilizing manner to uctuations in economic circumstances.
17Sokic and Fabris (2013), which, to the best of my knowledge provides the only existing estimates for Montenegro,
found that the ECB monetary policy had been acyclical with respect to ination and anticyclical with respect to
output growth (both coe¢ cients were positive but only the latter was statistically signicant). However, this study
covered an earlier time period, i.e., 2002-11.
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This section has provided suggestive evidence so far that Montengros monetary policy has been
constrained by its euroization, both in terms of the transmission and appropriateness of monetary
policy in response to output uctuations. Has this a¤ected Montenegro in ways that we would
expect from economic theory? Standard open economy theory would predict that, in the absence
of monetary exibility, external shocks will translate into greater real volatility. Furthermore, the
lack of exchange rate exibility would shift the burden of real exchange rate adjustment to domestic
prices. Since joining a currency union implies importing, to a lesser or greater extent, the policy
credibility of the union, the expected e¤ect on the level of ination would be to lower it. Finally,
xing the exchange rate would be expected to introduce volatility in foreign exchange reserves and
monetary aggregates as the monetary authorities attempt to keep conditions consistent with the
xed exchange rate.
Are these expectations in line with the Montenegrin experience? A look at Table 6 helps explore
this question. Unfortunately we cannot run a pre- and post-treatment in this case given that
Montenegro adopted the euro even before its independence, and hence there is no pre-euroization
data. For comparison purposes, I, therefore, provide the corresponding statistics for Montenegro
and Serbia. It is clear that volatility (as measured by the standard deviation) of GDP and GNI
growth, both nominal and real, has been greater for Montenegro. Regarding ination, while the
average level has been lower in Montenegro, volatility has been higher. Finally, the volatility of
broad money growth and foreign exchange reserves, the latter both in levels and as a proportion of
external debt) have also been higher in Montenegro.18 These outcomes are in line with theoretical
expectations. There is one interesting exception however. The average growth rate of GDP and
GNP have been higher for Montenegro. This is in contrast to some existing literature that generally
nds that countries with xed exchange rates experience, on average, lower growth and ination.
The sample size here two countries is of course too small to draw broader conclusions.19
5 Endogeneity of Structural Evolution and Other Aspects
As mentioned earlier in Section 2, one of the criteria typically utilized to gauge the case for currency
union is the degree of trade integration. Integration may itself, of course, follow from joining a
common currency area. Given our earlier ndings of lack of symmetry between Montenegin and
Eurozone shocks, and the suggestive evidence surrounding constraints on monetary policy, could
one still make a strong case for Montenegro joining the Eurozone on the grounds that increased
symmetry will follow membership? While the fact that Montenegro only recently became indepen-
dent, and that it has experienced no regime other than euroization since then a¤ects the possible
depth of our analysis, I nevertheless attempt a preliminary exploration in this section. I nd that
Montenegro presents an interesting picture in that it appears to have become less integrated with
the Euro area over the last decade.
Consider rst Table 7, which presents the average annual exports from Montenegro over the
periods 2006-11 and 2012-16, and underlines the fact that most of Montenegros exports around
two-thirds of the total are classied as services. Moreover, this share has increased over time. The
other striking observation that emerges is that the share of the Euro Area in Montengros exports
has declined dramatically from an average of 47 percent to 21 percent over the years! The share of
18 In the case of the level of foreign exchange reserves, I provide the coe¢ cient of variation rather than the standard
deviation, given the large di¤erences in averages involved compared to the other variables, which are either ratios or
in growth rate form.
19See, for example, the well-known study by Edwards (2001).
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Table 6: Macroeconomic volatility over the period 2006 to 2016. Source: Authors calculations
based on WDI
Average St. Dev. Average St. Dev.
GDP Growth 2.89 4.49 1.66 2.97
GDP Per Cap. Growth 2.77 4.50 2.15 2.98
GNI Growth 1.45 3.83 0.37 2.25
GNI Per Cap. Growth 1.33 3.85 0.87 2.28
Real GDP Growth 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03
Real GNI Growth 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.02
Broad Money Growth 22.68 43.53 15.89 12.85
Inflation 4.50 4.57 6.73 3.27
FX Reserves 592998158 0.24* 13379130114 0.14*
FX Reserves to External Debt 27.69 10.81 41.96 6.04
* Coefficient of variation
Montenegro Serbia
the other major trading partner for Montenegro, that is, Serbia, on the other hand, has remained
stable. Finally, although not shown in the table, Montenegrin exports of goods have steadily
declined in absolute terms from about 550 million dollars in 2006 to about 360 million dollars in
2016. The decline was marked around the turbulent period of 2009-11, when the Eurozone crisis
hit, following which Montenegrin exports are yet to recover. Imports, on the other hand, have
grown steadily over this period from 1.8 billion to 2.3 billion dollars, implying that the trade balance
in goods has been signicantly negative. I expand on these observations below.
Table 7: Evolution of exports by composition and major destination - 5 year averages. Source:
Authors calculations based on IMF DOTS and UN COMTRADE
Goods Services Total
2006-2011 0.54 1.06 1.61
2012-2016 0.42 1.33 1.76
Eurozone Serbia Croatia
2006-2011 0.47 0.23 0.03
2012-2016 0.21 0.26 0.10
Exports (billions of US$)
Shares of Goods exports
Table 8 compares, in a bit more detail, the Montenegrin experience with other Yugoslav Re-
publics, recent Balkan entrants to the EU (Bulgaria and Romania), and recent entrants to the Eu-
rozone (i.e., the Baltic republics). The table indicates that, as is typical of small open economies,
trade constitutes a large proportion of Montenegrin GDP. At more than 100 percent, trade as a
12
proportion of GDP is much greater for Montenegro than the average value for the Eurozone (around
80 percent). Only Slovenia and Estonia report higher values. Less expected is the nding that this
proportion has sharply declined from an average of 130.6 percent just before the Eurozone crisis
(i.e., over 2006-08) to 102.1 percent over 2014-16. This trend, which is the opposite to that for
the Eurozone in general (where the average increased from 77 percent to 84 percent) and virtually
all the other countries listed in the table,20 is in line with our earlier nding of falling exports, and
makes Montenegro stand out as an outlier. The proportion for Serbia, by contrast, increased from
about 82 percent to 102 percent, and for Croatia from about 85 percent to 94 percent.
Consistent with the trend suggested by the previous table, Table 8 also indicates that the
proportion of trade in services as a proportion of GDP increased dramatically for Montenegro
between 2006 and 2016. Indeed, while a similar change occurred in several other countries, at
almost 18 percentage points the magnitude of the shift is by far the largest for Montenegro.
Table 8: Total trade and trade in services (as a percentage of GDP) averaged over 2006-08 and
2014-16. Source: Authors calculations based on WDI
Country Trade Trade in Services Trade Trade in Services
Bosnia and Herz. 89.3 13.6 88.7 12.2
Bulgaria 119.6 26.5 127.6 25.0
Croatia 85.4 29.4 94.1 32.9
Estonia 136.6 34.8 156.5 44.4
Euro area 77.0 17.7 84.3 23.2
Latvia 96.2 23.8 121.1 27.2
Lithuania 120.4 19.7 153.3 28.2
Macedonia, FYR 103.4 21.2 113.1 25.8
Montenegro 130.6 25.3 102.1 42.9
Romania 71.9 14.1 83.1 16.5
Serbia 81.7 11.2 102.7 22.9
Slovenia 133.4 20.9 145.3 25.6
2006-08 2014-16
Table 9 helps focus more on optimum currency area-related concerns. Here we look at the degree
of trade integration as measured by the share of total exports and imports from each country that
are destined to and from the Eurozone and the European Union at large (recall McKinnon (1963)).
Again, the numbers present an interesting picture. First of all, contrary to what one would expect
from the endogeneity hypothesis proposed by Frankel and Rose (1998), the share of exports going
to the Eurozone have not increased signicantly in Estonia or Slovenia, countries that joined the
Eurozone earlier during this period.21 That this may in part be due to the Eurozone crisis is
supported by the fact that this proportion declined in most of the countries. The same trend
applies to the share of goods trade (exports plus imports) as a whole rather than exports. Several
countries, including the two early joiners saw their shares either fall (by more than 13 percent in the
case of Slovenia), or not rise by much. Overall, the support for the endogeneity hypothesis is hardly
20Bosnia and Herzegovina is the only exception but here the proportion remained almost unchanged.
21Slovenia became a member in 2007 while Estonia joined in 2011.
13
overwhelming here. Second, Montenegro again is an outlier. The share of its goods exports going
to the Eurozone declined by about 40 percentage points and that of total trade with the Eurozone
by about 43 percentage points! In order to check for whether this is simply due to trade diversion
to the larger EU area, the table provides data for the latter. The picture is almost identically
dramatic. The share of exports going to the EU fell by about 31 percentage points while the share
of Montenegros trade with the EU fell by about 34 points. The numbers are somewhat lower
than the corresponding ones for the Eurozone, probably because the larger EU fared slightly better
than the Eurozone in the years following the crisis, which cushioned the decline in Montenegrin
exports to these countries. The decline in Montenegros trade with the Eurozone and the larger EU
countries nevertheless stands out, especially given that both Croatia and Serbia saw their shares
increase. Given Montenegros unilateral euroization, these developments are radically at odds with
the endogeneity hypothesis.
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In sum, trade as a proportion of GDP has declined while trade in services has sharply risen
during the period of a little over a decade since Montenegros independence. This has involved an
absolute decline in the value of exports to the rest of the world since the Eurozone crisis. Moreover,
unilateral euroization has surprisingly been accompanied by a declining share of trade with the other
members of the currency union and with the larger European Union.
Thus far we have mainly focused on three issues, the extent of synchronization between shocks
to Montenegrin and Eurozone economies, the degree of Montenegros trade integration with the
Eurozone, and the extent of loss of monetary autonomy for Montenegro and the macroeconomic
impacts thereof. These aspects have implications for the magnitude of transaction cost savings
and the extent to which policy can respond to shocks. But the loss of monetary policy may not be
a major setback if the economy joining a currency union is diversied and similar in its production
structure to the member countries. Another important criteria to judge the utility of Montenegro
adopting the euro, therefore, is the extent of its similarity to the Eurozone. The rest of this section
explores this issue in a bit more detail.
As a rst pass, lets take a look at the extent of concentration or diversication of Montene-
gros trade relative to the rest of the world as a whole. Table 10 illustrates period averages for
Montenegro and comparator economies of: (1) the number of products exported and imported,
(2) the concentration of exports and imports, and (3) the diversication of exports and imports.
The number of products traded is captured at the three-digit SITC (Rev. 3) level. UNCTAD
measures the concentration index as a Herndahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI), based on the following
expression:
Hj =
qPn
i=1 (xij=Xj)
2  p1=n
1 p1=n ; Hj 2 [0; 1]
where xij is the value of export (or import) for country j and product i, Xj =
nP
i=1
xij is the sum of
exports (or imports) of product j for country i, and n is the number of products (SITC Revision 3
at 3-digit group level). An index value closer to 1 indicates that a countrys exports or imports are
highly concentrated in a few product lines.
Finally, UNCTAD computes the diversication index by measuring the absolute deviation of
the trade structure of a country from world structure. Specically,
Sj =
P
i jxij   xij
2
; Sj 2 [0; 1]
where xij denotes the share of product i in total exports or imports of country j, while xi is the
share of product i in total world exports or imports. The higher the index, the greater the degree
of divergence relative to the world economy.
For purposes of comparison, I present similar data for other regional countries. Some salient
observations emerge from the numbers. First, the number of active product lines on the export side
are much lower for Montenegro in comparison to other countries, even the relatively land-locked
ones like Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, the number of export lines has been quite stable
over the years. Second, Montenegrin exports are much more concentrated than those from other
regional economies. That Montenegrin exports are concentrated is not a surprise, given its size.
However, Montenegrin exports are dramatically more concentrated even in comparison with other
small regional economies such as Macedonia, FYR and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Montenegro really
16
is an outlier in this dimension, although less so than a decade ago (the index has declined from an
average of 0.42 in 2006-08 to 0.24 in 2013-16. Third, Montenegros export basket scores higher
than any other regional economy in the divergence of its export structure from the world norm.
Fourth, and rather unsurprisingly, the di¤erences on the import side are generally much less stark
than those on the export side. Taken together these numbers reect the exceptional concentration
and narrowness of Montenegrin export structure.
Table 10: Various Indexes of merchandise export concentration and diversication. Source:Authors
calculations based on data from UNCTADstat
2000-05 2006-08 2009-12 2013-16 2000-05 2006-08 2009-12 2013-16
Number of Products
Bosnia and Herz. 190.7 216.0 221.0 220.8 239.8 243.3 246.5 247.8
Bulgaria 228.5 238.0 242.8 243.3 240.7 250.7 250.0 251.8
Croatia 228.8 234.0 232.5 238.3 248.0 250.0 248.8 248.5
Montenegro - 109.0 116.5 108.3 - 220.0 218.3 219.5
Romania 229.5 239.7 241.0 243.3 245.0 249.3 248.0 248.3
Serbia - 241.0 241.5 245.0 - 250.0 248.5 249.3
 Slovenia 229.5 237.7 237.0 240.5 248.7 251.3 249.8 249.5
Macedonia (FYR) 175.0 192.7 197.3 200.5 229.8 238.7 237.3 238.8
Concentration
Bosnia and Herz. 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.06
Bulgaria 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.09
Croatia 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07
Montenegro - 0.42 0.37 0.24 - 0.09 0.09 0.08
Romania 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06
Serbia - 0.09 0.07 0.10 - 0.08 0.12 0.11
 Slovenia 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.11
Macedonia (FYR) 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.17 0.11 0.10 0.11
Diversification
Bosnia and Herz. 0.65 0.63 0.61 0.60 0.41 0.39 0.35 0.35
Bulgaria 0.50 0.49 0.44 0.46 0.35 0.30 0.29 0.31
Croatia 0.50 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.27 0.24 0.26 0.29
Montenegro - 0.70 0.71 0.70 - 0.45 0.44 0.44
Romania 0.55 0.44 0.42 0.42 0.33 0.26 0.26 0.27
Serbia - 0.55 0.53 0.51 - 0.28 0.33 0.34
 Slovenia 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.31
Macedonia (FYR) 0.65 0.66 0.62 0.67 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.45
Exports Imports
17
So far we have explored the extent to which Montenegros trade structure resembles the rest
of the world. Our main interest, however, is in the issue of euroization, and in that context, the
more interesting basis for evaluation is the Eurozone rather than the world. Table 11 provides such
a comparison for economic structures. Again, I provide information for Montenegro and several
other regional economies as well as recent Eurozone entrants (i.e., the Baltic states). The period
spanned covers 2000-16, and I report averages for sub-periods. The statistics that I employ are
the commonly used Bray-Curtis and modied Finger-Kreinin indexes. The former, which varies
between 0 and 1, measures the extent of dissimilarity between the economic structures of countries
j and k, and is constructed as follows:
djk =
NP
i=1
jyij   yikj
NP
i=1
(yij + yik)
where yij is the share of sector i in country js value-added, yik is the corresponding share for the
Eurozone, and N is the total number of sectors. The greater the calculated value of the index, the
higher the extent of dissimilarity between a countrys economic structure and the Eurozone. In the
limit, with djk = 1, the two countries are completely dissimilar in that there is no overlap between
their structures of production. The calculations are based on 10 sectors covering both goods and
services (see the footnote to Table 11 for a detailed list of the sectors).
The modied Finger-Kreinin index varies between 0 and 100, and is calculated as follows:
fjk = min(yij , yik)
An index value of 100 indicates the greatest extent of structural similarity between the economies.
The two indexes largely convey a similar picture. According to the Bray-Curtis index, Montene-
gro has one of the most dissimilar economic structures relative to the Eurozone among regional
economies. However, Lithuania, in spite of having recently joined the Eurozone, continues to have
an equally dissimilar structure. The Finger-Kreinin index indicates that Montenegro has the lowest
extent of similarity with the Eurozone economy over the entire time period. Notice that the two
indices have been quite stable for Montenegro, the former varying between 0.18 and 0.19 over the
period 2006-16, and the Finger-Kreinin index varying between 69.6 and 70.9 over the same period.
There does not seem to be much evidence of endoneous growth of structural similarity following
the adoption of the euro. Notice also that Estonia, Latvia, and Slovenia, i.e., all the Eurozone
members with the exception of Lithuania, display a much higher degree of similarity of economic
structure with the Eurozone.
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Table 12 extends the analysis to Montenegrin exports and imports. I use annual data from UN
Comtrade, which provides information for the European Union as a whole rather than the Eurozone.
Furthermore, I separately calculate the indexes for trade in goods (SITC Rev. 3, categories 0-9)
and services (Extended Balance of Payments Services or EBOPS classication, 2002). Again,
Montenegros export structure is rather di¤erent from that of European Union countries. This
holds for both goods and services. The average value of the Bray-Curtis index over 2013-15 was
0.6 for goods and 0.56 for services. The corresponding values of the Finger-Kreinin index were 39.9
and 43.9, respectively. Similarity increased somewhat between 2006-08 but has been stagnant since
then. Not surprisingly, and less informatively, Montenegro is much more similar to the European
Union on the import side than the export side.
Table 12: Indexes for similarity between Montenegrin and European Union exports and imports.
Source: UN Comtrade
Exports Imports Exports Imports
Goods (SITC 3)
2006-08 0.69 0.16 31.24 83.76
2009-12 0.60 0.25 39.81 75.26
2013-15 0.60 0.25 39.93 75.12
Services (EBOPS)
2006-08 0.59 0.31 41.00 68.63
2009-12 0.56 0.26 44.10 73.45
2013-15 0.56 0.30 43.86 70.08
Bray-Curtis Index Finger-Kreinin Index
Another measure of structural similarity is the Grubel-Lloyd Index of intra-industry trade, which
is given by:
GLij = 1 
nP
k=1
jxijk  mijkj
nP
k=1
(xijk +mijk)
where xijk is the export of industry k goods from country i to country j, while mijk are the
corresponding imports. The index varies between 0-1, with a higher value representing greater
intra-industry trade in goods. I employed SITC Rev. 2 data at the 2-digit level of disaggregation,
which yields 68 sub-sectors. For comparison purposes, I provide data for three other former
Yugoslav Republics (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia, FYR). While Montenegros
intra-industry trade has almost doubled starting from a low base, it is still the lowest by far among
the economies reported. Given our previous ndings about the concentration of Montenegrin
production structure, this is hardly surprising. By way of comparison, Brixiová et al. (2010)
calculated the Grubel-Lloyd index for Estonia, another small open economy, to be close to 0.3 in
2007, four years before joining the Eurozone. An older but more comprehensive study, Fidrmuc
(2001), found an average index value of 0.44 in 1998 for trade between central and east European
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countries (CEECs) and the European Union.22
Table 13: Grubel-Lloyd index of intra-industry trade in 2007 and 2015 with the EU. Source: Au-
thors calculations based on UN Comtrade
Bosnia and Herz. Montenegro Serbia Macedonia, FYR
2007 0.43 0.08 0.44 0.30
2015 0.50 0.15 0.68 0.36
The overall nding that has emerged from our analysis reinforces the earlier nding from Section
3 of limited structural symmetry between Montenegro and the Eurozone. Moreover, the degree of
similarity, and by implication the symmetry of shocks, does not seem to have increased following
euroization. How have these structural di¤erences translated into the aggregate behavior of the
trade balance? Figure 3, which shows the evolution of the balance of goods trade and balance of
services trade separately, for the period 2008-16, reveals an interesting picture. While the Eurozone
has run a trade surplus in goods since the crisis, Montenegro has experienced a huge trade decit
averaging about 44 percent. And while Montenegros surplus in services trade, which averaged
almost 18 percent over the period, mitigated the overall trade decit, the Eurozone ran a small
surplus in services, averaging less than 1 percent. The gure, with the wide bands representing
Montenegrin decits (surpluses) in goods (services) trade bounding corresponding Eurozone plots
from above and below eloquently highlights how di¤erences in economic structure have transformed
into di¤erences in aggregate behavior.
Figure 3: Trade balance (as a proportion of GDP) in goods and services, 2008-16. Source: UNC-
TADstats.
22 I calculated this number from Table A2 of the paper.
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6 Concluding Remarks
Relatively little research exists on the experience of the two countries that have unilaterally euroized.
This paper has focused on Montenegro  a small open economy in the context of the relevant
optimum currency area issues. While Montenegro is likely to have benetted from importing
policy credibility through o¢ cial euroization, the admittedly preliminary evidence that I present
suggests that: (1) the Montenegrin economy is only weakly synchronized with the Eurozone, (2) this
weak synchronization, in the absence of monetary autonomy or exchange rate-based stabilization
mechanisms, raises the costs of currency union, and (3) there is little evidence that euroization has
resulted in greater integration of the economy with the Eurozone. Indeed, if anything, Montenegro
has become less integrated by some measures such as the share of Montenegros merchandise exports
destined for the Eurozone. Large current account decits nanced to a signicant extent by FDI
inows directed towards the (largely non-tradable) real estate, banking, and construction sectors
increases the salience of currency concerns. Recent experience has shown that membership of a
currency union does not mitigate the threat posed by continuous and large current account decits.
While it is challenging, given the lack of adequate data, to evaluate the net benets of currency
union membership with any reasonable degree of precision, the absence of a lender of last resort, a
scal union, or a voice in monetary policy, if anything, only serve to enhance these concerns.
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